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High interest rate currencies tend to appreciate.  This is the uncovered interest rate parity (UIP) puzzle.
It is primarily a statement about short-term interest rates and how they are related to exchange rates.
Short-term interest rates are strongly affected by monetary policy.  The UIP puzzle, therefore, can
be restated in terms of monetary policy.  Do foreign and domestic monetary policies imply exchange
rates that violate UIP?  We represent monetary policy as foreign and domestic Taylor rules.  Foreign
and domestic pricing kernels determine the relationship between these Taylor rules and exchange rates.
We examine different specifications for the Taylor rule and ask which can resolve the UIP puzzle.
We find evidence in favor of a particular asymmetry.  If the foreign Taylor rule responds to exchange
rate variation but the domestic Taylor rule does not, the model performs better.  A calibrated version
of our model is consistent with many empirical observations on real and nominal exchange rates, including
Fama's negative correlation between interest rate differentials and currency depreciation rates.
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Uncovered interest rate parity (UIP) predicts that high interest rate currencies will
depreciate relative to low interest rate currencies. Yet for many currency pairs and
time periods we seem to see the opposite. The inability of asset-pricing models to
reproduce this fact is what we refer to as the UIP puzzle.
The UIP evidence is primarily about short-term interest rates and currency
depreciation rates. Monetary policy exerts substantial inuence over short-term
interest rates. Therefore, the UIP puzzle can be restated in terms of monetary
policy: Why do countries with high interest rate policies have currencies that tend
to appreciate relative to those with low interest rate policies?
The risk-premium interpretation of the UIP puzzle asserts that high interest
rate currencies pay positive risk premiums. The question, therefore, can also be
phrased in terms of currency risk: When a country pursues a high-interest rate
monetary policy, why does this make its currency risky? For example, when the
Fed sharply lowered rates in 2001 and the ECB did not, why did the euro become
relatively risky? When the Fed sharply reversed course in 2005, why did the dollar
become the relatively risky currency? This paper formulates a model of interest
rate policy and exchange rates that can potentially answer these questions.
To understand what we do it's useful to understand previous work on monetary
policy and the UIP puzzle.1 Most models are built upon the basic Lucas (1982)








where St denotes the nominal exchange rate (price of foreign currency in units
of domestic), nt denotes the intertemporal marginal rate of substitution of the
domestic representative agent, t is the domestic ination rate and asterisks de-
note foreign-country variables. Equation (1) holds by virtue of complete nancial
markets. It characterizes the basic relationship between interest rates, nominal
exchange rates, real exchange rates, preferences and consumption.
Previous work has typically incorporated monetary policy into equation (1)
via an explicit model of money. Lucas (1982), for example, uses cash-in-advance
constraints to map Markov processes for money supplies into the ination term,
exp(t   
t), and thus into exchange rates. His model, and many that follow it,
performs poorly in accounting for data. This is primarily a reection of the weak
empirical link between measures of money and exchange rates.
1Examples are Alvarez, Atkeson, and Kehoe (2007), Backus, Gregory, and Telmer (1993),
Bekaert (1994), Burnside, Eichenbaum, Kleshchelski, and Rebelo (2006), Canova and Marrinan
(1993), Dutton (1993), Grilli and Roubini (1992), Macklem (1991), Marshall (1992), McCallum
(1994) and Schlagenhauf and Wrase (1995).
2Our approach is also built upon equation (1). But | like much of the modern
theory and practice of monetary policy | we abandon explicit models of money in
favor of interest rate rules. Following the New Keynesian macroeconomics litera-
ture (e.g., Clarida, Gal , and Gertler (1999)), the policy of the monetary authority
is represented by a Taylor (1993) rule. Basically, where Lucas (1982) uses money
to restrict the ination terms in equation (1), we use Taylor rules. Unlike his
model, however, our allows for dependence between the ination terms and the
real terms, nt and n
t. This is helpful for addressing the evidence on how real and
nominal exchange rates co-move.
A sketch of what we do is as follows. The simplest Taylor rule we consider is
it =  + 1t + zt ; (2)
where it is the nominal short-term interest rate, t is the ination rate, zt is a
\policy shock," and  and 1 are policy parameters. We also assume that the
private sector can trade bonds. Therefore the nominal interest rate must also
satisfy the standard (nominal) Euler equation,
it =  logEt nt+1e t+1 ; (3)
where (as above) nt+1 is the real marginal rate of substitution. An equilibrium
ination rate process must satisfy both of these equations at each point in time,





 + zt + logEt nt+1 e t+1
: (4)
A solution to equation (4) is an endogenous ination process, t, that is jointly de-
termined by the response of monetary authority and the private sector to the same
underlying shocks. By substituting such a solution back into the Euler equation
(3), we arrive at what Gallmeyer, Hollield, Palomino, and Zin (2007) (GHPZ)
refer to as a `monetary policy consistent pricing kernel:' a (nominal) pricing ker-
nel that depends on the Taylor-rule parameters  and 1. Doing the same for the
foreign country, and then using equation (1), we arrive at a nominal exchange rate
process that also depends on the policy parameters  and 1. Equations (1){(4)
(along with specications for the shocks) fully characterize the joint distribution
of interest rates and exchange rates and, therefore, any departures from UIP.
Given a Taylor rule such as (2), and its foreign counterpart, we can ask whether
the implied exchange rate process in (1) tends to appreciate when the implied
interest rate in (3) is relatively low. If so, then the source of UIP deviations can
be associated with this Taylor rule. Moreover, we can generalize the specication
of the Taylor rule in equation (2) and analyze the consequences of alternative
monetary policies for currency exchange rates. In addition, we can ask whether the
Taylor rule parameters are identied by the UIP facts. Cochrane (2007) provides
3examples in which policy parameters and the dynamics of the shocks are not
separately identied by the relationship between interest rates and ination. Our
framework has the potential for identifying monetary policy parameters from the
properties of currency exchange rates.
Our paper proceeds as follows. We begin by ignoring real exchange rate varia-
tion. This means that nt = n
t and, according to equation (1), relative PPP holds:
log(St=St 1) = t   
t. This is a useful starting point because it provides focus
for the essence of our question: \how do Taylor-rule-implied ination dynamics
aect exchange rates?" We also go one step further and set nt = n
t = er, thus
abstracting from real interest rate variation (this doesn't really matter for nominal
exchange rates and it makes the analysis easier). The resulting Euler equation for
the nominal interest rate (with lognormality) is as follows.2




The model therefore boils down to two equations for each country | equations (2)
and (5) | along with a specication for the policy shocks, zt in equation (2). As
is shown below, the latter must necessarily feature stochastic volatility. Otherwise
the conditional variance in equation (5) would be a constant and UIP would hold
(up to a constant). The solution for ination is of the form (zt;vt), where vt is the
volatility of zt. Most of our analysis focuses on variation arising from vt because
only it aects currency risk.
Our rst results are negative in nature. We nd that simple Taylor rules of
the form (2) can generate deviations from UIP, but not as large as those typically
focused upon in the literature.3 The basic reason is straightforward. The Euler
equation (5) imposes restrictions between the current interest rate and moments
of future ination. The Taylor rule imposes an additional, contemporaneous re-
striction between the current interest rate and current ination. It says that a
volatility shock that increases ination by 1% must increase the interest rate by
more than 1%. This is because 1 > 1, the so-called \Taylor principle" required
2Equation (5) also shows how our paper | at least the initial part | relates to the benchmark
New-Keynesian setup. All that really distinguishes the two is the conditional variance term. But,
for us, this is where all the action is. That is, if ination were homoskedastic then the nominal
interest rate would satisfy the Fisher equation (up to a constant), the dierence equation (4)
would be linear, and the solution for ination would be in the same class as, say, Clarida, Gal ,
and Gertler (1999). What would also be true, however, is that UIP would be satised (up to a
constant) and Fama's (1984) well-known regression of the depreciation rate on the interest rate
dierential would yield a (population) slope coecient of 1.0. Our paper would be nished before
it even began. Stochastic volatility, therefore, is not a choice, it is a requirement. The only issue
is where it comes from.
3Specically, our model (without real rate variation) can generate slope coecients from
Fama's (1984) regression of depreciation rates on interest rate dierentials that are less than
unity, but not less than zero.
4for the ination solution to be non-explosive. However, if ination is a station-
ary, positively autocorrelated process, then its conditional mean in equation (5)
must increase by less than 1%. The only way that both can be satised is if the
conditional variance in equation (5) decreases. But this means that the mean
and variance of the (log) pricing kernel are positively correlated, something which
contradicts Fama's (1984) necessary conditions for resolving the anomaly. There
are two ways around this. The rst is that volatility is negatively autocorrelated.
This is empirically implausible. The second is that the volatility shock that aects
ination also aects the real interest rate (and the real exchange rate). This is the
subject of Section 3.2.
This reasoning | spelled out in detail in Section 3.1.4 | is admittedly com-
plex. But the basic point is not. Taylor rules of the form (2) imply restrictions
on the co-movement of the mean and variance of the pricing kernel. Getting this
co-movement right is critical for resolving the UIP puzzle, so these restrictions can
be binding. Models of the ination term in equation (1) that are driven by exoge-
nous money supplies do not impose such restrictions. Neither do models in which
an exogenous ination process is used to transform real exchange rates into nom-
inal exchange rates. The sense in which we're learning something about how the
conduct of modern monetary policy relates to exchange rates is the sense in which
these restrictions identify the policy parameters,  and 1, and the parameters of
the shock process zt.
Our next results are more positive. While continuing to abstract from real
exchange rate and interest rate variability, we examine two alternative Taylor
rules relative to that in equation (2). In both cases there are parameterizations of
the model that admit UIP deviations similar to those observed in data. The rst
alternative introduces an additional variable and an asymmetry to the Taylor rule
(2). The variable is the contemporaneous currency depreciation rate, log(St=St 1).
The asymmetry is that the foreign central bank reacts more to the exchange rate
than does the domestic central bank. Or, in concrete terms, the Bank of England
reacts to variation in the pound/dollar exchange rate, but the Fed does not. Such
an asymmetry seems plausible. The international role of the U.S. dollar versus the
pound is certainly not symmetric. A small country like New Zealand might pay
closer attention to the kiwi/yen exchange rate than a large country like Japan.
There is also some empirical and theoretical support for such an asymmetry (c.f.
Benigno (2004), Benigno and Benigno (2008), Clarida, Gal, and Gertler (1998),
Eichenbaum and Evans (1995), Engel and West (2006)).
The second alternative Taylor rule we consider is based on McCallum (1994)
and is emphasized in Woodford (2003). We include the lagged interest rate into
equation (2). Like McCallum, we nd parameterizations of the model that work.
Our approach extends his work by endogenizing the currency risk premium which,
5in his paper, is exogenous.4 This is an important step since it constrains the sense
in which the UIP anomaly is driven by endogenous equilibrium ination risk. That
is, in our model, a shock is realized, the Taylor rule responds to that shock, and
as a result so does ination. Whether or not this shock commands a risk premium
depends on the parameters of the model. We can then ask if the way in which
monetary policy reacts to shocks is consistent with risk premiums that are capable
of creating sizable deviations from UIP.
The nal sections of our paper move beyond expository examples and develop a
model that can be taken to the data. We use a model of nt and n
t to incorporate
real exchange rate and interest rate variation. We use Epstein and Zin (1989)
preferences and we model foreign and domestic consumption as following long-run
risk processes as in Bansal and Yaron (2004) and the exchange rate applications in
Bansal and Shaliastovich (2008) and Colacito and Croce (2008). Our model does
not feature nominal frictions, so ination reacts to consumption shocks (since they
appear in the Taylor rule) but not the other way around.5 We solve for endogenous
ination in the same manner as described above, but inclusive of the nt term in
the dierence equation (4).
Our last set of results are both qualitative, as above, and quantitative. We
characterize conditions under which real and nominal exchange rates will resolve
the UIP puzzle and show that the latter depend on the Taylor rule parameters.
We show that, as above, Taylor rule-implied ination tends to hinder the model's
performance, reducing the deviations from UIP. The logic is basically the same
as our simplest, nominal-variability-only model described above. Nevertheless, we
are able to nd a calibration that satises the following criteria: (i) Fama's (1984)
UIP coecient is negative, (ii) UIP holds unconditionally, so that the mean of the
risk premium is is zero, (iii) changes in real and nominal exchange rates are highly
correlated (Mussa (1986)), (iv) exchange rate volatility is high relative to ination
dierentials, (v) exchange rates exhibit near random-walk behavior but interest
rate dierentials are highly autocorrelated, (vi) international pricing kernels are
highly correlated but international aggregate consumption growth rates are not
4Engel and West (2006) also study a model of how Taylor rules aect exchange rates. Their
analysis, while focusing on a dierent set of questions, is related to McCallum's in that they
interpret their `policy shock' as an amalgamation of an actual policy shock and an exogenous risk
premium. Our paper relates to theirs in that both derive an exchange rate process as the solution
to a forward-looking dierence equation. The main dierence is that our deviations from UIP are
endogenous.
5Similar to Bansal and Shaliastovich (2008), Colacito and Croce (2008), and Verdelhan (2010)
we treat foreign and domestic consumption exogenously, remaining silent on the goods-market
equilibrium that gives rise to the consumption allocations. We simply exploit the fact that, with
complete nancial markets, equation (1) will hold in any such equilibrium. We then calibrate the
joint distribution of foreign and domestic consumption to match the data and ask if the implied
real and nominal exchange rates and interest rates t the facts. A more formal treatment and
justication is provided in Section 3.
6(Brandt, Cochrane, and Santa-Clara (2006)), (vii) domestic real and nominal in-
terest rates are highly autocorrelated with means and volatilities that match data.
Our calibrated values for the Taylor rule parameters satisfy conditions required for
a solution to exist and, interestingly, are also in the ballpark of typical reduced-
form estimates. We nd 1 = 1:1 and 2 = 0:74, where the latter is the coecient
on consumption growth, the analog of the output gap in our setting.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we provide
a terse overview of existing results on currency risk and pricing kernels that are
necessary for our analysis. Section 3 develops our main model of nominal and real
exchange rates and Section 3.1 examines the special case of zero real variability.
Section 3.2 provides qualitative results on the main model from Section 3, Section
4 conducts the quantitative exercise and Section 5 concludes.
2 Pricing Kernels and Currency Risk Premiums
We begin with a terse treatment of existing results in order to x notation. The
level of the spot and one-period forward exchange rates, in units of U.S. dollars
(USD) per unit of foreign currency (say, British pounds, GBP), are denoted St
and Ft. Logarithms are st and ft. USD and GBP one-period interest rates (con-
tinuously compounded) are denoted it and i
t. Covered interest parity implies that
ft   st = it   i
t. Fama's (1984) decomposition of the interest rate dierential
(forward premium) is
it   i








 pt + qt
This decomposition expresses the forward premium as the sum of qt, the expected
USD depreciation rate, and pt, the expected payo on a forward contract to receive
USD and deliver GBP. We dene the latter as the foreign currency risk premium.
We dene uncovered interest parity (UIP) as pt = 0. The well-known rejections of
UIP are manifest in negative estimates of the parameter b from the regression





+ residuals : (6)





Fama (1984) noted that necessary conditions for b < 0 are
Cov(pt;qt) < 0 (8)
Var(pt) > Var(qt) (9)
7Our approach revolves around the standard (nominal) pricing-kernel equation,
bn+1
t = Et mt+1bn
t+1 ; (10)
where bn
t is the USD price of a nominal n-period zero-coupon bond at date t and
mt is the pricing kernel for USD-denominated assets. The one-period interest rate
is it   logb1
t. An equation analogous to (10) denes the GBP-denominated
pricing kernel, m
t, in terms of GBP-denominated bond prices, b
t.
Backus, Foresi, and Telmer (2001) translate Fama's (1984) decomposition into
pricing kernel language. First, assume complete markets so that the currency
depreciation rate is





Fama's (1984) decomposition becomes
it   i
t = logEt m
t+1   logEt mt+1 (11)
qt = Et logm




t+1   Et logm
t+1

  (logEt mt+1   Et logmt+1) (13)
= Vart(logm
t+1)=2   Vart(logmt+1)=2 ; (14)
where equation (14) is only valid for the case of conditional lognormality. Basically,
Fama's (1984) conditions state that the means and the variances must move in
opposite directions and that the variation in the variances must exceed that of the
means.
Our objective is to write down a model in which b < 0. Inspection of equations
(8) and (14) indicate that a necessary condition is that pt vary over time and that,
for the lognormal case, the log kernels must exhibit stochastic volatility.
3 Model
Consider two countries, home and foreign. The home-country representative agent's
consumption is denoted ct and preferences are of the Epstein and Zin (1989) (EZ)
class:
Ut = [(1   )c

t + t(Ut+1)]1=
where  and  characterize patience and intertemporal substitution, respectively,
and the certainty equivalent of random future utility is
t(Ut+1)  Et[U
t+1]1= ;
so that  characterizes (static) relative risk aversion (RRA). The relative mag-
nitude of  and  determines whether agents prefer early or late resolution of
8uncertainty ( < , and  > , respectively). Standard CRRA preferences corre-











The nominal marginal rate of substitution | the pricing kernel for claims denom-
inated in USD units | is then
mt+1 = nt+1e t+1 ;
where t+1 is the (continuously-compounded) rate of ination between dates t and
t+1. The foreign-country representative agent's consumption, c
t, and preferences
are dened analogously. Asterisks' are used to denote foreign variables. Foreign
ination is 
t+1.
The domestic pricing kernel satises Et(mt+1Rt+1) = 1 for all USD-denominated
asset returns, Rt+1. Similarly, Et(m
t+1R
t+1) = 1 for all GBP-denominated re-










= 1 : (16)
We assume that international nancial markets are complete for securities denom-
inated in goods units, USD units and GBP units. This implies the uniqueness of













Equation (17) must hold in any equilibrium with complete nancial markets. This
is true irrespective of the particular goods-market equilibrium that gives rise to the
consumption allocations ct and c
t that are inherent in nt and n
t. Our approach
is to specify ct and c
t exogenously and calibrate them to match the joint behav-
ior of data on domestic and foreign consumption. We are silent on the model
of international trade that gives rise to such consumption allocations. Bansal
and Shaliastovich (2008), Colacito and Croce (2008), Gavazzoni (2008), Verdelhan
(2010) and others follow a similar approach. Hollield and Uppal (1997), Sercu,
Uppal, and Hulle (1995) and the appendix in Verdelhan (2010) | all building
upon Dumas (1992) | are examples of more fully-articulated complete markets
models in which imperfectly-correlated cross-country consumption is generated by
transport costs. Basically, our approach is to these models what Hansen and Sin-
gleton (1983) rst-order-condition-based approach was to Mehra and Prescott's
(1985) general equilibrium model.
9Following Bansal and Yaron (2004) and the application to real exchange rates
of Bansal and Shaliastovich (2008), domestic consumption growth, xt+1, contains
a small and persistent component (its `long-run risk') with stochastic volatility:









ut+1 = (1   'u)u + 'uut + uu
t+1 (20)
wt+1 = (1   'w)w + 'wwt + ww
t+1 (21)
Foreign consumption growth, x
t+1 is dened analogously. The innovations are as-
sumed to be multivariate normal and independent within-country: (x;l;u;w)
0

NID(0;I), but we allow for correlation across countries: j  Corr(j;j
), for
j = (x;l;u;w).
The process (18){(21) looks complicated, but each of the ingredients are nec-
essary. Stochastic volatility is necessary because without it the currency risk pre-
mium would be constant and the UIP regression parameter, b, would be 1.0. Long-
run risk | by which we mean time variation in the conditional mean of consump-
tion growth, lt | isn't critical for exchange rates, but it is for achieving a realistic
calibration of interest rates. It decouples the conditional mean of consumption
growth from other moments of consumption growth, thereby permitting persistent
and volatile interest rates to co-exist with relatively smooth and close-to-i.i.d. con-
sumption growth. Finally, cross-country correlation in the innovations is critical
for achieving realistic cross-country consumption correlations. The latter imposes
substantial discipline on our calibration (c.f., Brandt, Cochrane, and Santa-Clara
(2006)).
The nal ingredients are domestic and foreign Taylor rules. We assume that
there are no nominal frictions, so that monetary policy has no impact on consump-
tion. We'll consider several dierent specications, but the most general ones are
of the form




+ 4it 1 + zt (22)
where zt is a policy shock governed by




vt+1 = (1   'v)v + 'vvt + vv
t+1 : (24)
Analogous equations, denoted with asterisks, characterize the foreign-country Tay-
lor rules. The rst four variables in the Taylor rule are dened above and have
10each played a prominent role in the literature. We include the exogenous policy
shocks, zt, in order to allow for some exibility in the distinction between real and
nominal variables. Without policy shocks endogenous ination will depend only on
consumption shocks. The same will therefore be true of nominal exchange rates.
We nd it implausible that monthly variation in nominal exchange rates is 100%
attributable to real shocks. This being said, the identication of the parameters of
the zt process is an important issue. We deal with it explicitly in the next section.
Note that stochastic volatiliy in the policy shocks is a necessary condition for them
to have any aect on currency risk premiums.
3.1 Nominal Variability Only
The crux of our question asks \how does Taylor-rule-implied ination aect ex-
change rates?" In order to focus on this we begin by abstracting from real exchange
rate variation. We set nt = n
t, implying that log(St=St 1) = t   
t, so that rel-
ative PPP holds exactly. We don't take this specication seriously for empirical
analysis. We use it to try to understand exactly how the Taylor rule restricts
ination dynamics and, therefore, nominal exchange rate dynamics. As we'll see
in Section 3.2, the lessons we learn carry over to more empirically-relevant models
with both nominal and real variability.
We start with the simplest possible variant of the Taylor rule (22):
it =  + 1t + zt ; (25)
where the process for zt is described above, in equations (23-24). There are, of
course, many alternative specications. A good discussion related to asset pricing
is Ang, Dong, and Piazzesi (2007). Cochrane (2007) uses a similar specication
to address issues related to price-level determinacy and the identication of the
parameters in equation (25). We begin with it for reasons of tractability and
clarity. We then go on to include the nominal depreciation rate and the lagged
interest rate, as appear in the general expression (22).
In addition to nt = n
t, we abstract from real interest rate variation by setting
nt = n
t = 1. For exchange rates, conditional on nt = n
t, this is without loss of
generality. The (nominal) short interest rate, it =  logEt mt+1, is therefore
it =  logEt e t+1




The Taylor rule (25) and the Euler equation (26) imply that ination must satisfy











11Given the log-linear structure of the model, guess that the solution has the form,
t = a + a1zt + a2vt : (28)
Instead of solving equation (27) forward, just substitute equation (28) into the
Euler equation (26), compute the moments, and then solve for the ai coecients









2('z   1)2('v   1)
where
C  a + a1z(1   'z) + a2v(1   'v)   (a2v)2=2 :
More explicit derivations are given in Appendix A. Ination and the short rate can









2('z   1)2('v   1)
vt





2('z   1)2('v   1)
vt
= C + 'za1zt + 1a2vt ;
and the pricing kernel as

























D  C + (va2)2=2 :
Now consider a foreign country, say the UK. Denote all foreign variables with
an asterisk. The foreign Taylor rule is
i





t and its volatility following processes analogous to equations (23{24). For
now, zt and z
t can have any correlation structure. Repeating the above calculations
for the UK and then substituting the results into equations (11{14) we get
it   i
t = 'za1zt   '
za
1z




qt = D   D + a1'zzt   a
1'
zz

















where D  C + (va2)2=2. It is easily veried that pt + qt = it   i
t.
Result 1: Symmetry and 'z = 0
If all foreign and domestic parameter values are the same and 'z =
'














Calculations are provided in Appendix A.
3.1.1 Discussion
The sign of Cov(pt;qt) does not depend on 'z. That is, Cov(pt;qt) is essentially
the covariance between the kernel's mean and its variance and, while vt appears in
both, zt appears only in the mean. The assumption 'z = 0 is therefore relatively
innocuous in the sense that it has no eect on one of the two necessary conditions
(8) and (9).
We require 1 > 1 for the solution to make sense. Therefore, according to
equation (31), 0 < b < 1 unless 'v < 0. The latter is implausible. Nevertheless,
the UIP regression coecient can be signicantly less than unity and the joint
distribution of exchange rates and interest rates will admit positive expected excess
returns on a suitably-dened trading strategy.
We cannot, at this point, account for b < 0. But the model does deliver some
insights into our basic question of how Taylor rules restrict ination dynamics and,
consequently, exchange rate dynamics. We summarize with several remarks.
13Remark 1: This is not just a relabeled ane model
Inspection of the pricing kernel, equation (29), indicates that it is basically a
log-linear function of two unobservable factors. Is what we are doing just a rela-
beling of the class of latent-factor ane models described in Backus, Foresi, and
Telmer (2001)? The answer is no and the reason is that the Taylor rule imposes
economically-meaningful restrictions on the model's coecients.
To see this consider a pricing kernel of the form
  logmt+1 =  + vt + v
1=2
t "t+1 (32)
where vt is an arbitrary, positive stochastic process, and an analogous expression
describes m
t+1. Backus, Foresi, and Telmer (2001) show that such a structure
generates a UIP coecient b < 0 if  > 0 and  < 2=2. The former condition
implies that the mean and variance of negative the log kernel move in the same
direction | this gives Cov(pt;qt) < 0 | and the latter implies that the variance
is more volatile so that Var(pt) > Var(qt).
Now compare equations (32) and (29). The Taylor rule imposes the restrictions
that  can only be positive if 'v is negative (because a2 < 0 since 1 > 1) and
that  = v'v. Moreover, both  and  are restricted by value of the policy
parameter 1. In words, the UIP evidence requires the mean and the variance of
the pricing kernel to move in particular ways relative to each other. The Taylor
rule and its implied ination dynamics place binding restrictions on how this can
happen. The unrestricted pricing kernel in equation (32) can account for b < 0
irrespective of the dynamics of vt. Imposing the Taylor rule says that vt must be
negatively autocorrelated.
Remark 2: Reason that negatively-correlated volatility is necessary for b < 0?
First, note that a2 < 0, so that an increase in volatility vt decreases ination t.
Why? Suppose not. Suppose that vt increases. Then, since 1 > 1, the Taylor rule
implies that the interest rate it must increase by more than ination t. However
this contradicts the stationarity of ination which implies that the conditional
mean must increase by less than the contemporaneous value. Hence a2 < 0. A
similar argument implies that a1 < 0 from equation (28). The point is that the
dynamics of Taylor-rule implied ination, at least until we get the real interest
rate involved in Section 3.2, are driven by the muted response of the interest rate
to a shock, relative to that of the ination rate.
Next, to understand why 'v < 0 is necessary for b < 0, consider again an
increase in volatility vt. Since a2 < 0, the U.S. interest rate it and the contempo-
raneous ination rate t must decline. But for b < 0 USD must be expected to
14depreciate. This means that, although t decreases, Ett+1 must increase. This
means that volatility must be negatively autocorrelated.
Finally, consider the more plausible case of positively autocorrelated volatility,
0 < 'v < 1. Then b < 1 which is, at least, going in the right direction (e.g., Backus,
Foresi, and Telmer (2001) show that the vanilla Cox-Ingersoll-Ross model generates
b > 1). The reasoning, again, derives from the `muted response of the interest rate'
behavior required by the Taylor rule. This implies that Cov(pt;qt) > 0 | thus
violating Fama's condition (8) | which says that if ination and expected ination
move in the same direction as the interest rate (because 'v > 0), then so must the
USD currency risk premium. The regression (6) can be written
qt = c + b(pt + qt)   forecast error ;
where `forecast error' is dened as st+1   st   qt. Since Cov(pt;qt) > 0, then
Var(pt + qt) > Var(qt) and, therefore, 0 < b < 1.
Even more starkly, consider the case of 'v = 0 so that b = 0. Then the exchange
rate is a random walk | i.e., qt = 0 so that st = Etst+1 | and all variation in the
interest rate dierential is variation in the risk premium, pt. Taylor rule ination
dynamics, therefore, say that for UIP to be a good approximation, changes in
volatility must show up strongly in the conditional mean of ination and that this
can only happen if volatility is highly autocorrelated.
Remark 3: Identication of policy parameters
Cochrane (2007) provides examples where policy parameters like 1 are impossible
to distinguish from the parameters of the unobservable shocks. Result 1 bears
similarity to Cochrane's simplest example. We can estimate b from data but, if we
can't estimate 'v directly then there are many combinations of 'v and 1 that are
consistent with any estimate of b.
Identication in our special case, however, is possible because of the conditional
variance term in the interest rate equation: it = Ett+1   Vartt+1. To see this
note that, with 'z = 0, the autocorrelation of the interest rate is 'v and, therefore,







which identies 1 because the variables on the left side are observable.
The more general case of 'z 6= 0 doesn't work out as cleanly, but it appears
that the autocorrelation of ination and the interest rate jointly identify 'z and
'v and the above ratio again identies the policy parameter 1. These results are
all special cases of those described in Backus and Zin (2008).
153.1.2 Asymmetric Taylor Rules
The series of ane models outlined in Backus, Foresi, and Telmer (2001) suggest
that asymmetries between the foreign and domestic pricing kernels are likely to
play a critical role in achieving b < 0. Their approach is purely statistical in nature.
There are many parameters and few sources of guidance for which asymmetries
are plausible and which are not. This section asks if foreign and domestic Taylor
rule asymmetries are plausible candidates.
mierda
Suppose that foreign and domestic Taylor rules depend on the exchange rate
in addition to domestic ination and a policy shock:
it =  + 1t + zt + 3 log(St=St 1) (33)
i





The asymmetry that we'll impose is that 3 = 0 so that the Fed does not react to
the depreciation rate whereas the Bank of England does. Foreign central banks
reacting more to USD exchange rates seems plausible. It's also consistent with
some empirical evidence in, for example, Clarida, Gal , and Gertler (1999), Engel
and West (2006), and Eichenbaum and Evans (1995).
Assuming the same processes for the state variables as equations (23) and (24)
(and their foreign counterparts), guess that the ination solutions look like:
t = a + a1zt + a2z
t + a3vt + a4v
t  a + A>Xt







t  a + A>Xt








Interest rates, from Euler equations with real interest rate = 0, must satisfy:
it = C + B>Xt
i
















C  a + a1z(1   'z) + a2
z(1   '






























C  a + a

















16The solution for the a coecients and the following result are provided in Appendix
B.
Result 2: Asymmetric reaction to exchange rates
If foreign and domestic Taylor rules are equations (33) and (34), with
3 = 0 and all remaining foreign and domestic parameter values the
same, then b < 0 if 
3 > 1.
Remark 4: Pathological policy behavior?
Interpreted literally, 
3 > 0 means that the Bank of England reacts to an appreci-
ation in GBP by increasing the British interest rate. However, at the same time,
there exist sensible calibrations of the model in which Cov(i
t;log(St=St 1)) > 0.
This makes the obvious point that the Taylor rule coecients must be interpreted
with caution since all the endogenous variables in the rule are responding to the
same shocks.
3.1.3 McCallum's Model




















McCallum solves the implicit dierence equation for st   st 1 and nds that it
takes the form








He species values  = 0:8 and  = 0:2 | justied by the policy-makers desire to
smooth interest rates and `lean-into-the-wind' regarding exchange rates | which
resolve the UIP puzzle by implying a regression coecient from our equation (6)
of b =  4. McCallum's insight was, recognizing the empirical evidence of a risk
premium in the interest rate dierential, to understand that the policy rule and
the equilibrium exchange rate must respond to the same shock that drives the risk
premium.
17In this section we show that McCallum's result can be recast in terms of our
pricing kernel model and a policy rule that targets the interest rate itself, not the
interest rate dierential. The key ingredient is a lagged interest rate in the policy
rule:
it =  + 1t + 4it 1 + zt ; (35)
where the processes for zt and its volatility vt are the same as above. Guess that
the solution for endogenous ination is:
t = a + a1zt + a2vt + a3it 1 ; (36)










C  a + a1z(1   'z) + a2v(1   'v)   (a2v)2=2





















2('v   1   4)
and that matching coecients imply
a1'z
1   a3





























'z   1   4
zt +
(1 + 4)2






C + 'za1zt + (1 + 4)a2vt

18The pricing kernel is

















The GBP-denominated kernel and variables are denoted with asterisks. If we as-
sume that all foreign and domestic parameter values are the same (i.e.,  = ), the





























It is easily veried that pt + qt = it   i
t.
The nominal interest rate and the interest rate dierential have the same au-
tocorrelation:
Corr(it+1;it) = Corr(it+1   i
t+1;it   i
t)
= 1   (1   'z)(1 + 1a1)2Var(zt)
Var(it)
  (1   'v)(1a2)2Var(vt)
Var(it)
:









To see the similarity to McCallum's model dene   zt   z
t , and subtract
the UK Taylor rule from its U.S. counterpart in (35). Assuming symmetry, we get
it   i













where the second equality follows from market completeness and our simple pricing
kernel model. This is the same as McCallum's policy rule with 1 =  and 4 = .
19His UIP \shock" is the same as our pt =  a2
1(vt   v
t)=2, with 'z = 'v = 0.
With 'v = 0 we get the same UIP regression coecient,  4=1. McCallum's
model is basically a two-country Taylor rule model with a lagged interest rate
in the policy rule and no dynamics in the shocks. Allowing for autocorrelated
volatility diminishes the model's ability to account for a substantially negative
UIP coecient, a feature that McCallum's approach does not recognize. A value
of b < 0 can only be achieved if volatility is less autocorrelated that the value of
the interest rate smoothing policy parameter.
3.1.4 Summary
The goal of this section has been to ascertain how the imposition of a Taylor rule
restricts ination dynamics and how these restrictions are manifest in the exchange
rate. What have we learned?
A good context for understanding the answer is the Alvarez, Atkeson, and
Kehoe (2008) (AAK) paper. The nuts and bolts of their argument goes as follows.










AAK argue that if exchange rates follow a random walk then variation in the
conditional mean term must be small.6 Therefore (according to them), \almost
everything we say about monetary policy is wrong." The idea is that, in many
existing models, the monetary policy transmission mechanism works through its
aect on the conditional mean of the nominal marginal rate of substitution, mt.
But if exchange rates imply that the conditional mean is essentially a constant
| so that `everything we say is wrong' | then the mechanism must instead be
working through the conditional variance.
If one takes the UIP evidence seriously, this isn't quite right. The UIP puzzle
requires variation in the conditional means (i.e., it says that exchange rates are
not a random walk).7 Moreover, it also requires that this variation be negatively
correlated with variation in the conditional variances, and that the latter be larger
than the former. In terms of monetary policy the message is that the standard
6i.e., random walk exchange rates mean that Et log(St+1=St) = 0, and, from equation (12),
Et log(St+1=St) =  Et(logmt+1  logm

t+1). Random walk exchange rates, therefore, imply that
the dierence between the mean of the log kernels does not vary, not the mean of the log kernels
themselves. More on this below.
7Of course, the variation in the forecast error for exchange rates dwarfs the variation in the
conditional mean (i.e., the R
2 from the Fama-regressions is very small). Monthly changes in
exchange rates certainly exhibit `near random walk' behavior, and for policy questions the dis-
tinction may be a second-order eect. This argument, however, does not aect our main point
regarding the AAK paper: that exchange rates are all about dierences between pricing kernels
and its hard to draw denitive conclusions about their levels.
20story | that a shock that increases the mean (of the marginal rate of substitution)
decreases the interest rate | is wrong. The UIP evidence says that we need to get
used to thinking about a shock that increases the mean as increasing the interest
rate, the reason being that the same shock must decrease the variance, and by
more than it increases the mean.
Now, to what we've learned. We've learned that symmetric monetary policies
as represented by Taylor rules of the form (25) can't deliver ination dynamics that,
by themselves, satisfy these requirements. The reason is basically what we label
the `muted response of the short rate'. The evidence requires that the conditional
mean of ination move by more than its contemporaneous value. But the one
clear restriction imposed by the Taylor rule | that the interest rate must move
less than contemporaneous ination because the interest rate must also be equal
to the conditional mean future ination | says that this can't happen (unless
volatility is negatively autocorrelated).
This all depends heavily on the real interest rate being a constant, something
we relax in the next section. What's going on is as follows. In general, the Euler
equation and the simplest Taylor rule can be written as







it =  + 1t + zt : (38)
The Euler equation (37) imposes restrictions between the current short rate and
moments of future ination. The Taylor rule (38) imposes an additional contempo-
raneous restriction between the current interest rate and current ination. To see
what this does, rst ignore the real parts of equation (37), rt and the covariance
term. Recalling that endogenous ination will be a function (zt;vt), consider a
shock to volatility that increases ination by 1%.8 The Taylor rule says that it
must increase by more than 1%, say 1.2%. But, if ination is a positively auto-
correlated stationary process, then its conditional mean, Ett+1, must increase by
less than 1%, say 0.9%. Equation (37) says that the only way this can happen is
if the conditional variance decreases by 0.2%; a volatility shock that increases t
must decrease Vartt+1. Therefore the mean and variance of the pricing kernel
must move in the same direction, thus contradicting what Fama (1984) taught us
is necessary for b < 0.
Phrased in terms of the exchange rate, the logic is equally intuitive. The
increase in the conditional mean of ination implies an expected devaluation in
USD | recall that relative PPP holds if we ignore real rates | which, given the
increasing interest rate implied by the Taylor rule, moves us in the UIP direction:
high interest rates associated with a devaluing currency. Note that, if volatility
8A shock to zt isn't particularly interesting in this context because it doesn't aect both the
mean and variance of the pricing kernel.
21were negatively autocorrelated, Ett+1 would fall and the reverse would be true;
we'd have b < 0.9
So, the contemporaneous restriction implied by the Taylor rule is very much a
binding one for our question. This points us in two directions. First, it suggests
that an interaction with the real interest rate is likely to be important. None
of the above logic follows if rt and Covt(nt+1;t+1) also respond to a volatility
shock. We follow this path in the next section. Second it points to something
else that the AAK story doesn't get quite right. Exchange rate behavior tells us
something about the dierence between the domestic and foreign pricing kernels,
not necessarily something about their levels. The above logic, and AAK's logic,
is about levels, not dierences. Symmetry makes the distinction irrelevant, but
with asymmetry it's important. What our asymmetric example delivers is (i)
ination dynamics that, in each currency, satises `muted response of the short
rate' behavior, and (ii) a dierence in ination dynamics that gets the dierence
in the mean and the variance of the kernels moving in the right direction.






> and consider the foreign and
domestic pricing kernels in the asymmetric model:













where  is a diagonal matrix of autoregressive coecients, and V (Xt) is a diagonal
matrix of conditional standard deviations. The asymmetric restriction that 3 = 0
and 
3 6= 0 eectively makes this a `common factor model' with asymmetric load-
ings on the common factors. A number of recent papers, Lustig, Roussanov, and
Verdelhan (2009) for example, have argued persuasively for such a specication.
What we've developed is one economic interpretation of their statistical exercise.10
More explicitly, consider the dierence in the mean and variance of the log
kernels from the symmetric and asymmetric examples of Sections 3.1 and 3.1.2.















9This intuition is also useful for understanding why we get 0 < b < 1 with positively auto-
correlated volatility. The RHS of the regression, the interest rate spread, contains both the mean
and the variance of ination. The LHS contains only the mean. If (negative) the mean and
the variance move in the same direction, then the RHS is moving more than the LHS and the
population value of b is less than unity.
10Note that if the conditional mean coecients on zt and vt were the same across m and m

then, contrary to AAK's assertion, monetary policy could aect the mean of the pricing kernel
while still allowing for a random walk exchange rate. This is simply because zt and vt would not
appear in the dierence between the means of the two log kernels.























where the a coecients are functions of the model's parameters, outlined above
and in more detail in the appendix. What's going on in the symmetric case is
transparent. pt and qt can only be negatively correlated if 'v < 0 (since a2 < 0).
The asymmetric case is more complex, but it turns out that what's critical is that
(a3   a
3) < 0. This in turn depends on the dierence (1   
3) being negative.
Overall, what the asymmetric Taylor rule does is that it introduces an asymmetry
in how a common factor between m and m aect their conditional means. This
asymmetry causes the common factor to show up in exchange rates, and it can
also ip the sign and deliver b < 0 with the right combination of parameter values.
3.2 Nominal and Real Variability
We now incorporate real exchange rate variability and an interaction between real
exchange rates and endogenous ination. There are no nominal frictions in the
model and thus monetary policy has no impact on real variables. The model
features both real and nominal shocks. The former have a direct eect on con-
sumption and, through the Taylor rules, an indirect eect on ination and the
exchange rate. The latter aect ination and exchange rates, but have no eect
on consumption.
Following Hansen, Heaton, and Li (2005), we linearize the logarithm of the real
pricing kernel, equation (15), around zero. The result is
  log(nt+1) = r + r





























x = (1   ); r
l =  (   )!l; r
v =  (   )!u; r
w =  (   )!w
Details for the derivation, together with the expressions for the constant r and the
linearization coecients !l, !u, and !w, can be found in Appendix D. Following
the ane term structure literature, we refer to r = [r
l r
u r
w]0 as real factor




w]0 as real prices of risk.
23The conditional mean of the real pricing kernel is equal to
Et lognt+1 =  (r + r
l lt + r
uut + r
wwt)












The conditional mean depends both on expected consumption growth and stochas-
tic volatility, whereas the conditional variance is a linear function of current
stochastic volatility processes only. Notice that, in the standard time and state
separable utility case, volatility is not priced as a separate source of risk and the
real pricing kernel collapses to the familiar:




Next, the real short rate is
rt   logEt(nt+1)
=  r + r



























































Result 3: The real UIP slope coecient
11Symmetry means that both the parameters governing the motion of the state variables and
the preference parameters are the same across countries. Similarly to the previous section, the
model can be extended to allow for asymmetric loadings and asymmetric state variables.
24If all foreign and domestic parameter values are the same, then the real
UIP regression parameter, obtained by the regressing the real interest


























Without the presence of both stochastic volatility and EZ preferences,
br is equal to one and, in real terms, UIP holds identically. Also, when
the long-run state variables, lt and wt, are perfectly correlated across
countries, the slope coecient reduces to br = r
u=rr
u. This is the case
considered by Bansal and Shaliastovich (2008).
For br to be negative, we require Cov(fr
t  sr
t;qr
t) < 0. The expression above makes
it evident that only stochastic volatility terms can contribute negatively to this
covariance. In particular, a necessary condition for a negative real slope coecient
is that the r and rr = (rr
u;rr
w)0 coecients have opposite sign, for at least one
of the stochastic volatility processes. A preference for the early resolution of risk
( < ) and an EIS larger than one ( < 0) deliver the required covariations.
3.2.1 Taylor Rule and Endogenous Ination
Domestic monetary policy is described by a Taylor rule in which the short interest
rate reacts to contemporaneous ination and expected consumption growth:12
it =  + 1t + 2lt + zt ; (41)
where the policy shock zt evolves according to equations (23-24), with the restric-
tion that z = 0. For currency risk, the latter is innocuous since it has no eect
on the conditional variance of the nominal pricing kernels.
Following the technique developed above, we guess that the solution for en-
dogenous ination has the form
t = a + a1lt + a2ut + a3wt + a4zt + a5vt ;
substitute it into the Euler equation (3), compute the moments, and then solve for















12For parsimony, we use expected consumption growth, lt, and not its current level, xt, as is
instead standard in the literature. Doing so reduces our state space by one variable. The model
















[(uu)2 + (ww)2 + (vv)2]
where the constant term, the factor loadings and the pricing of risk of the nominal
pricing kernel are
 = r + a + a2(1   'u)u + a3(1   'w)w + a5(1   'v)v
l = r
l + a1'l; u = r
u + a2'u; w = r
w + a3'w; z = a4'z; v = a5'v
x = r
x; l = r
l + a1; u = r
u + a2; w = r
w + a3; z = a4; v = a5
The linearized nominal pricing kernel is
 logmt+1 =  lognt+1 + t+1















The Taylor rule parameters, through their determination of the equilibrium in-
ation process, aect both the factor loadings on the real factors as well as their
prices of risk. This would not be the case if the ination process was exogenously
specied. On the other hand, the factor loadings and the prices of risk of the
nominal state variables, zt and vt, depend exclusively on the choice of the Taylor
rule parameters.
The nominal short rate is
it   logEt(mt+1)
=   + llt + zzt + ruvt + rwwt + rvvt ;
where
  =   
1
2
[(uu)2 + (ww)2 + (vv)2] ;













26The nominal interest rate dierential, the expected depreciation rate and the risk
premium can be derived from equations (11{14). Assuming symmetry across coun-
tries, we have
qt = l(lt   l
t) + z(zt   z
t) + u(ut   u
t) + w(wt   w
t) + v(vt   v
t) ;
ft   st = l(lt   l
t) + z(zt   z
t) + ru(ut   u
t) + rw(wt   w















Result 4: The nominal UIP slope coecient
If all foreign and domestic parameter values are the same, the nominal













t ) + uruVar(ut   u

t) + wrwVar(wt   w
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l Var(lt   l
t) + 2
zVar(zt   z




t) + (rv)2Var(vt   v
t)
:
As was the case for the real UIP slope coecient, without EZ pref-
erences and stochastic volatility in consumption growth, long run risk
and policy shock, b = 1.
3.2.2 Discussion
The results obtained in this section rely crucially on three ingredients: EZ prefer-
ences, stochastic volatility and the choice of the Taylor rule parameters. We now
analyze their impact on the UIP slope coecient and risk premium.
Remark 5: With EZ preferences, volatility is priced as a separate source of risk
From the previous section, we learned that if we want to explain the UIP puzzle
we need stochastic volatility. In the model with real exchange rate variability, the
necessary variation for the real UIP slope, br, comes from consumption growth, in
the form of short-run volatility, ut, and long-run volatility, wt.
With standard expected utility ( = ), both the volatility real factor loadings
r
u and r
w, and the real prices of risk, r
u and r
w, collapse to zero. Consequently,
the real UIP slope coecient is identically equal to one. EZ preferences allow
agents to receive a compensation for taking volatility risk, to which they would
not be entitled with standard time-additive expected utility preferences. The con-
temporaneous presence of both stochastic volatility and EZ preferences is needed
to explain the anomaly in real terms. Without stochastic volatility in the real
pricing kernel, the real currency risk premium is constant and both of Fama's con-
dition are violated. Without EZ preferences, stochastic volatility in consumption
growth is not priced at all.
27Remark 6: The role of the Taylor parameters in the UIP slope coecient
Work in progress.
Remark 7: The role of persistence in stochastic volatility
Similarly to the purely nominal symmetric example of section 3.1, the persistence
of country specic volatility 'u plays a crucial role in the determination of the
sign of the UIP slope. Too see this, consider again for simplicity the case in which
the long-run factor lt and its volatility wt are perfectly correlated across countries.
Also, assume the policy shock zt is not autocorrelated ('z = 0). The nominal










t) + (rv)2Var(vt   v
t)
:
For the necessary condition of Cov(ft   st;pt) < 0 to be satised, we investigate
the coecients on short-run consumption volatility and policy shock volatility.
First, v and rv cannot have opposite sign. The reason is the same as in the
symmetric purely nominal example of the previous section: a shock to a nominal
state variable of ination, zt or vt, together with 1 > 1, imply the muted response
of interest rate to a nominal shock, relative to that of the ination rate. Therefore,
unless the policy shock volatility is negatively autocorrelated, the contribution of
the nominal state variables to Cov(ft   st;pt) is necessarily of the wrong sign.
As was the case for the purely nominal example, introducing asymmetries across
countries, or allowing for interest rate smoothing in the Taylor rules can overcome
this problem.
A dierent mechanism is at work for short-run consumption volatility. In this
case, similarly to what we have seen above for the real slope coecient, u and ru
can have dierent signs, provided that the agents in the economy have preference
for the early resolution of risk. However, a positive autocorrelation in stochastic
volatility necessarily works against it. This is a direct consequence of endogenizing
ination and deriving the GHPZ monetary policy consistent pricing kernel. To see
this, recall that
u = r









Since we require u and ru to have opposite signs for the resolution of the puzzle,
we must have a2 < 0. Therefore, u < r
u, and, all other things being equal, we
require a stronger preference for the early resolution ( << ) of risk, relative to
the one we needed for the real case.
28Consequently, it is in general harder to get a negative nominal UIP slope rather
than a negative real UIP slope. As we have seen, the rst reason is that the con-
tribution of the nominal state variables necessarily goes in the wrong direction,
at least in our simple symmetric case with Taylor rules reacting to (expected)
consumption growth and current ination. The second reason is that, with en-
dogenous ination, positive autocorrelated consumption volatility makes it harder
to get the required magnitudes of the factor loadings and prices of risk of short-
and long-run volatility. Nonetheless, a careful choice of Taylor parameters can
deliver the required Fama conditions.
4 Quantitative Results
We'd like our model to be able to account for the following exchange rate facts.
Foremost, of course, is the negative nominal UIP slope coecient. But other
important features are (i) UIP should hold unconditionally, so that the mean of
the risk premium, pt is zero, (ii) changes in real and nominal exchange rates are
highly correlated (Mussa (1986)), (iii) exchange rate volatility is high relative to
ination dierentials, (iv) exchange rates exhibit near random-walk behavior but
interest rate dierentials are highly autocorrelated, (v) international pricing kernels
are highly correlated but international aggregate consumption growth rates are
not (Brandt, Cochrane, and Santa-Clara (2006)). In addition, domestic real and
nominal interest rates should be highly autocorrelated with means and volatilities
that match data.
We calibrate our model using a monthly frequency. We begin by tying-down
as much as we can using consumption data. The parameters for domestic and
foreign aggregate consumption growth are chosen symmetrically so that (i) the
mean and standard deviation match U.S. data, (ii) the autocorrelation is close to
zero, (iii) the cross-country correlation is 0.30, and (iv) the autocorrelation of the
conditional mean, lt, is 0.993 and its cross-country correlation is 0.90 (following,
roughly, Bansal and Shaliastovich (2008), Bansal and Yaron (2004) and Colacito
and Croce (2008)). The autocorrelations of the short and long-run volatilities
are chosen, primarily, to match the autocorrelation in interest rates and ination
rates. The parameters of the policy shock processes, zt and z
t, are set so that
the shocks are independent across countries and uncorrelated across time (i.e.,
'z = '
z = 0). Finally, the level and persistence of the volatility of the policy
shocks are chosen | alongside risk aversion, intertemporal substitution, and the
Taylor rule parameters | to match (i) the variance of the nominal exchange rate,
(ii) the mean and variance of ination and the nominal interest rate, (iii) the
autocorrelation of the interest rate dierential (forward premium), and (iv) the





Subjective discount factor  0.999
Mean of consumption growth x 0.0016
Long run risk persistence 'l 0.993
Short run volatility level u 1.50e-5
Short run volatility persistence 'u 0.920
Short run volatility of volatility u 1.40e-6
Long run volatility mean w 2.80e-8
Long run volatility persistence 'w 0.950
Long run volatility of volatility w 5.66e-9
Policy shock persistence 'z 0
Policy shock volatility level v 1.00e-5
Policy shock volatility persistence 'v 0.94
Volatility of policy shock volatility v 1.73e-6
Risk aversion 1    5.0
Elasticity of intertemporal substitution 1=(1   ) 2.0
Taylor-rule parameter, ination 1 1.1
Taylor-rule parameter, consumption 2 0.74
Our model's population moments, evaluated at the parameter values of Table 1,
are reported in Table 2. By and large, the model performs pretty well. Endogenous
ination | the focal point of our paper | matches the the sample mean, variance
and autocorrelation of the U.S. data. The same applies for interest rates and the
interest rate dierential (the forward premium). Simulations of these variables are
reported in Figures 1 and 2. Real and nominal exchange rates t the Mussa (1986)
evidence. See Figure 3. Nominal exchange rate variability is higher than in the
data, but only slightly, at 18.6% versus 15.0%. This is good news in light of the
point made by Brandt, Cochrane, and Santa-Clara (2006); the high pricing kernel
variability required to explain asset prices (Hansen and Jagannathan (1991)) re-
quires either highly correlated foreign and domestic pricing kernels, highly variable
exchange rates, or some combination of the two. With standard preferences, low
cross-country consumption correlations rule out the former, thus implying that ob-
served exchange rate variability is too small relative to theory. Our model resolves
this tension with the combination of recursive preferences and high correlation in
cross-country long-run risk processes. This point has been made previously by
Colacito and Croce (2008). Its empirical validity is an open question.
30Where our model falls somewhat short is in the magnitude of the nominal UIP
slope coecient. While Fama's conditions are satised | see Figure 4 and the
\carry trade" graph, Figure 5 | we nevertheless get b =  0:20 whereas a rough
average from the data is around b =  2:00. Herein lies our overall message, which
echos that of Section 3.1. The restrictions on ination imposed by the Taylor
rule are binding in the sense that, although the slope coecient for real variables
may be strongly negative, its nominal counterpart is less so. Put dierently, if
the mapping between real and nominal variables is an exogenous ination process,
then, given our real model, a realistic nominal slope coecient would be easy to
obtain. Endogenous ination, on the other hand, ties one's hands in an important
manner.
This all presupposes symmetric Taylor rules. Further research should investi-
gate the asymmetries pointed at toward the end of Section 3.1.
Table 2
Sample and Population Moments
Moment Sample Population (Model)





E(it)  12 6.42 6.37
(it)  12 3.72 3.76
Corr(it;it 1) 0.98 0.97
E(it   i
t)  0:00 0.00
(it   i




E(st+1   st)  0:00 0.00
(st+1   st) 
p
12 15.00 18.61
Corr(st+1   st) 
p
12  0:00 0.05
br ?.?? -5.02
b   2:00 -0.20
5 Conclusions
How is monetary policy related to the UIP puzzle? Ever since we've known about
the apparent protability of the currency carry trade people have speculated about
31a lurking role played by monetary policy. The story is that, for some reason, central
banks nd themselves on the short side of the trade, borrowing high yielding
currencies to fund investments in low yielding currencies. In certain cases this
has seemed almost obvious. It's well known, for instance, that in recent years
the Reserve Bank of India has been accumulating USD reserves and, at the same
time, sterilizing the impact on the domestic money supply through contractionary
open-market operations. Since Indian interest rates have been relatively high, this
policy basically denes what it means to be on the short side of the carry trade.
This leads one to ask if carry trade losses are in some sense a cost of implementing
Indian monetary policy? If so, is this a good policy? Is there some sense in which
it is causing the exchange rate behavior associated with the carry trade?
Our paper's questions, while related, are less ambitious than these speculations
about India. What we've shown goes as follows. It is almost a tautology that










It is less a tautology that we can write down sensible stochastic processes for
these four variables that are consistent with the carry trade evidence.13 Previous
work has shown that such processes have many parameters that are dicult to
identify with sample moments of data. Our paper shows two things. First, that
by incorporating a Taylor rule for interest rate behavior we reduce the number
of parameters. Doing so is sure to deteriorate the model's t. But the benet is
lower dimensionality and parameters that are economically interpretable. Second,
we've shown that some specications of Taylor rules work and others don't. This
seems helpful in and of itself. It also shows that there exist policy rules which,
when combined with sensible pricing kernels, are consistent with the carry trade
evidence. This is a far cry from saying that policy is causing carry trade behavior
in interest rates and exchange rates, but it does suggest a connection that we
nd intriguing. In our models, for instance, there exist changes in the policy
parameters, 1 and 3, under which the carry trade prots go away.
Finally, it's worth noting that India, of course, is much more the exception
than the rule. Most central banks | especially if we limit ourselves to those
from OECD countries | don't have such explicit, foreign-currency related poli-
cies. However, many countries do use nominal interest rate targeting to implement
domestic policy and, therefore, we can think about central banks and the carry
13See, for example, Backus, Foresi, and Telmer (2001), Bakshi and Chen (1997), Bansal (1997),
Brenna and Xia (2006), Frachot (1996), Lustig, Roussanov, and Verdelhan (2009), and Sa a-
Requejo (1994).
32trade in a consolidated sense. For example, in early 2004 the UK less U.S. interest
rate dierential was around 3%. Supposing that this was, to some extent, a policy
choice, consider the open-market operations required to implement such policies.
The Bank of England would be contracting its balance sheet | selling UK govern-
ment bonds | while (at least in a relative sense) the Fed would be expanding its
balance sheet by buying U.S. government bonds. If the infamous carry-trader is
in between, going long GBP and short USD, then we can think of the Fed funding
the USD side of the carry trade and the Bank of England providing the funds for
the GBP side. In other words, the consolidated balance sheets of the Fed and
Bank of England are short the carry trade and the carry-trader is, of course, long.
In this sense, central banks and their interest-rate policies may be playing a more
important role than is apparent by just looking at their foreign exchange reserves.
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37Appendix A
Symmetric Model
The short rate must satisfy both the Euler equation and the Taylor rule:
it =  logEt mt+1 (A1)
it =  + 1t + zt ; (A2)
where the processes for zt and its volatility vt are








t are i.i.d. standard normal. Given that mt+1 = nt+1Pt=Pt+1 and
t+1 = log(Pt+1=Pt), set the real pricing kernel to a constant so that mt+1 =
exp( t+1). Guess that the solution for endogenous ination is:
t = a + a1zt + a2vt ; (A3)
Substitute equation (A3) into the Euler equation (A1) and compute the expecta-
tion. The result is
it = C + a1'zzt + (a2'v   a2
1=2)vt ; (A4)
where
C   n + a + a1z(1   'z) + a2v(1   'v)   (a2v)2=2
Substiute the postulated solution (A3) into the Taylor rule, match-up the resulting
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Both of these things are kind of trivial. They just say that the eect of a shock on









+ a1z(1   'z) + a2v(1   'v)   (a2v)2=2
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1)2('v   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2('z   1)2('v   1)
vt
= C + 'za1zt + 1a2vt
The pricing kernel is
























D  C + (va2)2=2
The GBP-denominated kernel and variables are denoted with asterisks. The
interest-rate dierential, the expected depreciation rate, qt, and the risk premium,
pt, are:
it   i
t = 'za1zt   '
za
1z




qt = D   D + a1'zzt   a
1'
zz

















It is easily veried that pt + qt = it   i
t.
If we assume that all foreign and domestic parameter values are the same (i.e.,












it =  + 1t + zt + 3dt
i





dt  log(St=St 1) = t   
t
State variables,




vt = v(1   'v) + 'vvt 1 + vv
t
and the associated foreign-country processes with asterisks and with all shocks








t = a + a1zt + a2z
t + a3vt + a4v
t  a + A>Xt







t  a + A>Xt
Interest rates, from Euler equations with real interest rate = 0:
it = C + B>Xt
i
















C  a + a1z(1   'z) + a2
z(1   '






























C  a + a


















it =  + 1(a + A>Xt) + zt + 3
 
a + A>Xt   a   A
>Xt

=  + 1a + 3(a   a) +
 
1A> + >





t =  + 




a + A>Xt   a   A
>Xt

=  + 
1a + 










z  [ 1 0 0 0 ] and >
z  [ 0 1 0 0 ]. Matching-up the coecients means
C =  + 1a + 3(a   a)
C =  + 
1a + 
3(a   a)
B = 1A> + >







To solve for the constants (the rst two equations):

1   1   3 3
 












where stuff and stuff are everything on the LHS of the solutions for C and C,
except the rst terms, a and a.
The B equations are eight equations in eight unknowns, A and A. Conditional
on these, the C equations are two-in-two, a and a. The B equations can be broken
into 4 blocks of 2. It's useful to write them out because you can see where the
singularity lies.









































































 UIP holds exactly. If 3 = 0 (so that the Fed ignores the FX rate), 'v = '
v
and 1 = 
1 (complete symmetry in parameters, save 3 and 
3) then a
singularity is 
3 = 1   'v. As 
3 approaches this from below or above, the
UIP coecient goes to 1.0.
 Anomaly resolved. Similarly, if 3 = 0, 'v = '
v and 1 = 
1 then a singularity
is 
3 = 1. As 
3 approaches from below, the UIP coecient goes to innity.
As 
3 approaches from above, it goes to negative innity.
The latter condition is where the UIP regression coecient changes sign. This says
that we need 
3 > 3. This may seem pathological. It says that | if we interpret
these coecients as policy responses (which we shouldn't) | the ECB responds
to an appreciation in EUR by increasing interest rates more than 1:1 (and more
than the `Taylor principle' magnitude of 1 > 1).
41Appendix C
Derivations for McCallum Model





C + a1'zzt + (a2'v   a2
1=2)vt

= ci + cizzt + civvt
and, for reasons that will become clear, dene
~ it  it   zciz   vciv
The exogenous state variables obey




vt = v(1   'v) + 'vvt 1 + vv
t
where a mean is now incorporated for z. I'm not sure if this thing is identied or
not. Denote the state vector as X>
t = [zt vt ~ it 1]> so that we can write
Xt = (I   ) + Xt 1 + V (Xt 1)1=2st 1
where
























The mean, variance and autocovariance of X are
>



































 Ination. Let t = a + A>
 Xt where A>
 = [a1 a2 a3]. Since
t = a + a1zt + a2vt + a3it 1 ;
we must have
a = a + a3 (cizz + civv) :
The unconditional moments are:








I worked one out by hand as a check:
2











The conditional moments are:
Ett+1 = a + A>

 












 Interest rate. Let it = ci + C>
i Xt, where C>
i = [ciz civ 0] and
C = a + a1z(1   'z) + a2v(1   'v)   (a2v)2=2
ci = C=(1   a3)
ciz = 'za1=(1   a3)
civ = (1 + 4)a2=(1   a3)
The moments are:








 Depreciation rate: dt = t 
t. With independence across countries we have




















43So | obviously, in this model where relative PPP holds exactly | we have a
strong counterfactual. The autocorrelation of the depreciation rate and the
ination rate are the same. Relaxing these things may work, to some extent.
Here's a start:
 = a   a
 + A>













 Interest rate dierential: it   i
t.
it   i
t = ci   ci + C>
i Xt   C>
iX
t
With independence, the moments are
 = ci   ci + C>





















 UIP Coecient. First the expected depreciation rate, with symmetry, is
qt = Etdt+1 = Et(t+1   
t+1)
= a   a + A>
 Xt   A>
X
t :





i Xt   C>
iX
t ; A>





i  0>A + C>
i 
0>A
and the regression coecient is
b =
C>





 p and q



































where the formulae for the conditional means is above (under the italicized
heading Ination).
44Appendix D
Linearization for the Pricing Kernel
The log of the equilibrium domestic marginal rate of substitution in equation (15)
is given by
log(nt+1) = log + (   1)xt+1 + (   )[logWt+1   logt(Wt+1)];
where xt+1  log(ct+1=ct) is the log of the ratio of domestic observed consumption
in t+1 relative to t and Wt is the value function. The rst two terms are standard
expected utility terms: the pure time preference parameter  and a consumption
growth term times the inverse of the negative of the intertemporal elasticity of
substitution. The third term in the pricing kernel is a new term coming from EZ
preferences.
We work on a linearized version of the real pricing kernel, following the ndings
of Hansen, Heaton, and Li (2005). In particular, I focus on the the value function
of each representative agent, scaled by the observed equilibrium consumption level
Wt=ct = [(1   ) + (t(Wt+1)=ct)]1=
=










where I use the linear homogeneity of t. In logs,
wct =  1 log[(1   ) +  exp(gt)];
where wct = log(Wt=ct) and gt  log(t(exp(wct+1 + xt+1))). Taking a linear
approximation of the right-hand side as a function of gt around the point  m, I get
wct   1 log[(1   ) +  exp( m)] +

 exp( m)
1    +  exp( m)

(gt    m)
   + gt
where  < 1. Approximating around  m = 0, results in   = 0 and  = , and for
the general case of  = 0, the \log aggregator", the linear approximation is exact
with   = 1    and  = .
Given the state variables of the economy, l, u and w, and the log-linear structure
of the model, we conjecture a solution for the value function of the form,
wct =  ! + !llt + !uut + !wwt;
where  !, !l, !u and !w are constants to be determined. Therefore
wct+1 + xt+1 =  ! + !llt+1 + !uut+1 + !wwt+1 + xt+1
45and, using the properties of lognormal random variables, gt can be expressed as
gt  log(t(exp(wct+1 + xt+1)))
= log(Et[exp(wct+1 + xt+1)]
1
)]




Using the above expression, we solve for the value-function parameters by matching
coecients




























The solution allows us to simplify the term [log Wt+1   logt(Wt+1)] in the
pricing kernel in equation (5):


















w + ut) :
Equation (39) follows by collecting terms. In particular,
r =  log + (1   ) +

2
(   )[(!uu)2 + (!ww)2]
r











x = (1   ); r
l =  (   )!l; r
v =  (   )!u; r

























Et(xt+1) =  + lt ; Vart(xt+1) = ut ;
E(xt+1) =  ; Var(xt+1) = u + Varlt ;
Cov(xt+1;xt) = 'lVarl ; Corr(xt+1;xt) =
'lVarlt
u+Varlt
 Long run risk:
Et(lt+1) = 'llt ; Vart(lt+1) = wt ;




Cov(lt+1;lt) = 'lVarlt ;; Corr(lt+1;lt) = 'l
 Short-run volatility:
Et(ut+1) = (1   'u)u ; Vart(ut+1) = 2
u ;





Cov(ut+1;ut) = 'uVarut ; Corr(ut+1;ut) = 'u
 Long-run volatility:
Et(wt+1) = (1   'w)w ; Vart(wt+1) = 2
w ;





Cov(wt+1;wt) = 'wVarwt ; Corr(wt+1;wt) = 'w
 Real pricing kernel:
Et lognt+1 =  (r + r









































 Real risk free interest rate:


































































t) = 0 ;
Var(dr
t+1) = 2[Var(lognt+1)   Cov(lognt+1;logn
t+1)]
 Ination:






























; corr(xt;t) = corr(xt+1;t)'l
 Nominal interest rate:
E(it) =   + ruu + rww + rvv
Var(it) = 2




























14The expressions for cross-country moments greatly simplify if we assume either independence
or perfect correlation in the stochastic volatility processes, ut and wt.
48 Nominal depreciation rate:
Et(dt+1) = qt ; E(dt) = 0
Var(dt+1) = 2[Var(logmt+1)   Cov(logmt+1;logm
t+1)]













Figure 1: Annualized Ination and the Nominal Interest Rate, 30-Year Simulation.
Discussion in Section 4.














Figure 2: Annualized Interest Rate Dierential (Forward Premium), 30-Year Sim-
ulation. Discussion in Section 4.













Figure 3: Log Real and Nominal Exchange Rate, 30-Year Simulation. Discussion
in Section 4.















Figure 4: Currency Risk Premium and Expected Depreciation, 30-Year Simulation.
Discussion in Section 4.













Figure 5: Log Nominal Exchange Rate and Interest Rate Dierential, 30-Year
Simulation. The interest rate dierential is USD less GBP. The exchange rate
is \price of GBP." So, UIP predicts that when the red line is above zero, the
blue line will increase. The protability of the carry trade is premised upon the
opposite. While it's obviously not clear from the graph (as in an analogous graph
of data), the latter tends to happen slightly more than the former. The graph also
highlights the riskiness of the carry trade. Variation in nominal exchange rates is
large relative to the interest dierential and its components, p and q. This graph
is discussed in Section 4.
54